Deep normative non-epistemic disagreements: there seem to be profound differences of opinion that are normative, but not epiesmic. That is, they are in no way about the principles of epistemic. Since the theory tells us that profound disagreements are differences of opinion on the fundamental principles of the epistere, we need a representation of deeply normative differences that are not epistemal. However, I think there is room to account for whether some differences of opinion on whether I have my hands, for example, are a profound disagreement. First, we must distinguish between what Thompson Clarke (1972) described as accidental doubt, such as cases where someone doubts the existence of his hands after an experiment or operation (see Clarke 1972, p. 758). In these cases, doubts arise in their worldviews – these doubts are intuitive in terms of their worldview (cf. Stroud 1984, chap. 3-5). These are the obvious doubts. Ambiguous doubts are doubts not only about a sentence or a cluster of proposals, but about an entire field or a worldview. Footnote 13 In such cases, the sentence I have is considered representative of an entire field, such as that there are physical things independent of the mind, where disagreements about me hands are representative of the broader field.
Footnote 14 How is the fundamental theory of the epistemic principle with regard to the Desiderata going? Let`s look at the classification first. Remember that in the case of the creation of the Earth, Henry and Richards were deeply dissociating themselves about the age of the Earth: that it should be less than 6,000 years old in the intended sense. Henry seemed to confirm that he was younger, while Richard seemed to deny it. This does not sound like a basic epistemical principle, but a complex quantification sentence: there is an x, x – Earth, and for each y, if x-y, the Y is more than 6000 years old. To take into account the fact that the case of the young earthly creator is a profound divergence of opinion, the proponent of the fundamental theory of the epismeristic principle will have to say that it is indirectly profound, because they are not directly divided on a fundamental episteremic principle, but indirectly (replacing pivotal obligations with fundamental epistemic principles). Turner D, Wright L (2005) Revisiting deep disagreement. Informal logic 25 (1): 25-35 Of course, one might think that the difference between the two theories really turns to the theory of pivotal obligations. At this point, one could say that the main difference between them is a difference in the explanatory insistence.
The proponent of the fundamental theory of normative principles would say that the disagreement referred to in the berkeley world is a profound disagreement because they feel compelled to argue over fundamental epistemic principles, while the Wittgensteinian would say that the questioning in the world of Berkeley is not derived, but that it is directly a profound disagreement , because target rates function as key obligations within their worldviews. In this way, there could only be a subtle difference in what proponents of any theory consider to be particularly important. In the previous section, I argued that the fundamental theory of the episizing principle faces two challenges. The first challenge was to explain how non-epistemic normative divergences are possible.